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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to present the results of two hypervelocity impact failure risk assessments for critical wire bundles exposed 
aboard the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS-1) to an increased orbital debris environment at its 824 km, 98.8 deg inclination orbit. The 
first “generic” approach predicted the number of wires broken by orbital debris ejecta emerging from normal impact with multi-layer 
insulation (MLI) covering 36, 18, and 6 strand wire bundles at a 5 cm standoff using the Smooth Particle Hydrodynamic (SPH) code.  
This approach also included a mathematical approach for computing the probability that redundant wires were severed within the bundle.  
Based in part on the high computed risk of a critical wire bundle failure from the generic approach, an enhanced orbital debris protection 
design was examined, consisting of betacloth-reinforced MLI suspended at a 5 cm standoff over a seven layer betacloth and Kevlar 
blanket, draped over the exposed wire bundles.  A second SPH-based risk assessment was conducted that also included the beneficial 
effects from the high (75 degree) obliquity of orbital debris impact owing to the flight orientation of the exposed wiring and shadowing by 
other spacecraft components. These factors resulted in a considerably reduced likelihood of critical wire bundle failure compared to the 
original baseline design with normal impacts and no shadowing. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction 
    NASA recently released a new orbital debris environment (ORDEM 3.0) that included an order of magnitude increase in 
particle counts in the 1mm size range, and a new component consisting of stainless steel particles, which are more dense and 
therefore more penetrating than the aluminum particles assumed in prior orbital debris models [1]. In light of this more 
hazardous environment, the NASA Engineering and Safety Council (NESC) sponsored an independent assessment of the 
orbital debris protection planned for the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS-1) in the summer of 2014.  One of the initial 
findings of the NESC team was that no assessment of the risk to the spacecraft wiring had been included (this wiring is 
exposed to obital debris on the zenith deck of the spacecraft). Some of this wiring supported critical functions that would be 
required in order to assure re-entry of the satellite at the end of its life.  As part of its support, several members of the NESC 
team developed and implemented a “generic” approach for determining the risk of critical function loss from hypervelocity 
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impact and penetration of critical wire bundles from steel and aluminum orbital debris particles impacting in the 7.3 to 14.6 
km/sec velocity range expected in the JPSS-1 orbit.   
    Based in part on the high computed risk of a critical wire bundle failure using the initial assessment approach, an 
enhanced orbital debris protection design was implemented, consisting of betacloth-reinforced MLI suspended at a 5 cm 
standoff over a seven layer betacloth and Kevlar blanket, draped over the exposed wire bundles.  A second SPH-based risk 
assessment was conducted that also included the beneficial effects from the high (75 degree) obliquity of orbital debris 
impacts (owing to the tilt of the zenith-facing deck supporting the cable runs), and shadowing by other spacecraft 
components. This analysis resulted in a considerably reduced likelihood of critical wire bundle failure compared to the 
original baseline design. This second approach is consistent with earlier wire failure assessments for the James Webb Space 
Telescope [2] and other spacecraft such as the Advanced Xray Astrophysics Facility [3], which assumed that any 
penetration of the shield over the wire bundle caused failure of the bundle. 
2. “Generic” Risk Assessment of Baseline MLI over Wire Bundles 
The team performed SPHC hydrocode assessments of orbital debris penetration through a “typical” wire harness (cable) 
with baseline multi-layer insulation (MLI) blanket protection as shown in Figure 1.  The SPHC (Smooth Particle 
Hydrodynamics in C) was developed by Stellingwerf (1985 – 1995).  This code formed the basis of the SPHINX hydrocode 
package used at Los Alamos National Laboratory (Wingate 1995 – 1998).  The present incarnation of SPHC, V12.8, runs up 
to one million particle problems on Windows ™ personal computers or work stations having 1.5 Gb of memory, without 
invoking virtual memory. In smooth particle hydrodynamics, the “particle” is the analog of the mesh point in a traditional 
hydrocode.  An SPH particle consists of a fixed mass of a particular material at a given position in space, together with a 
smoothing function, or “kernel,” that defines the particle’s extent.   
SPHC is a fully conservative code, meaning that mass, momentum, and angular momentum are exactly (analytically) 
conserved, and energy is conserved to the accuracy of the calculation.  A Runge-Kutta integration scheme is used that 
allows specification of the timestep accuracy.  The Mie-Grueneisen multi-phase equation of state (eos) in SPHC accepts the 
initial density and temperature of the material and computes the pressure, internal energy, phase and sound speed. In 
subsequent steps, the eos is used to compute the density and the internal energy, and then the resulting pressure, 
temperature, phase, and sound speed.   
As shown in Figure 2, a typical cable is assumed to consist of 36 wires, or 18 redundant wire pairs. The wires were 
placed in a hexagonal pattern in order to scale the damage seen in 36 wires to smaller wire bundles (of 18 and 6 wires, 
respectively).  It is noted that the actual hexagonal patterns undergoing hydrocode assessment were of 37, 19, and 7 wires, 
with damage to the last (deepest) wire neglected in the risk results for the 36, 18, and 6 wire strands. The risk assessment 
considered  a  one year exposure to  the ORDEM 3.0 orbital debris environment,  with particles striking normal to the 
lengths of the wires.  A 5 cm standoff between baseline MLI and wire harness (cable) was included in the hydrocode run.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  JPSS-1 wire harness geometry, showing baseline MLI, 5-cm standoff, plus Kapton™ and Lamiglas™ cable wrapping materials. 
 
Figure 2 shows a cross-section of the cable hex geometry, indicating how a cable of 37 single conducting wires can be 
broken down into 19-wire and 7-wire hexagonal component subcables, if desired.  Also, the graphical means of indicating a 
cut or “killed” wire is shown.  Results from the SPH analyses of the number of wires cut considering a variety of orbital 
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debris impact materials, velocities and diameters are shown in Figure 3.  Note that the expected number of penetrated wires 
increases with velocity, diameter, and density of the projectile.  Figure 4 shows the likelihood of an entire cable failing 
based on the number of redundant wire failures.  When more than half of the wires (i.e., 19 wires in a 36-wire bundle) are 
penetrated, there is a 100% chance that two redundant wires have been hit, thus killing the critical instrument that the wires 
are feeding.   
Once the number of penetrated wires is predicted through SPH hydrocode assessment (and associated with a probability 
of cable failure, as shown in Figure 4), the analyst can determine the probability of those conditions occurring on orbit using 
NASA’s Orbital Debris Environment Model, ORDEM 3.0 [4].  In our case, an Excel spreadsheet was developed that 
interpolates the size and velocity of steel and aluminum particles causing from 1 to 36 wire failures based on the hydrocode 
results, then calculates the likelihood of those particle combinations impacting normally on a one foot length of cable in a 
single year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  37-Hex wire cable arrangement, and subcables of 19 and 7 wires.  “Killed” wires shown in black. 
 
Table 1. shows the expected probability of orbital debris induced cable failure for a one year exposure of a one foot 
length of 6-, 18-, and 36-strand cables, where every strand within a cable carries a critical function and has a redundant wire 
somewhere in the cable carrying the same critical function.  However, real spacecraft cables are often bundled together, 
shadowing one another, and are located and oriented where other spacecraft components shadow them from the debris flux.  
They also often carry less-than-critical functions.  Table 2 shows that considering these effects of shadowing, position, and 
criticality can lower the likelihood of critical cable failure (for the 8 foot cable example) by a factor of 20.  
3.  Evaluating an Enhanced MMOD 
Based in part on the high computed risk of a critical wire bundle failure from the generic approach, the JPSS program 
decided to implement an enhanced micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) protection design consisting of betacloth-
reinforced MLI suspended at a 5 cm standoff over a seven layer betacloth and Kevlar blanket, draped over the exposed wire 
bundles, as shown in Figure 5.  It is noteworthy that 99.5% of orbital debris approaches from within the X-Y (orbital) plane, 
and that orbital debris approaching from the Y axis (from the “front” as viewed by the spacecraft) makes up nearly 50% of 
this flux.  This threat would impact the deck at 14.6 km/sec and impact the blanket at 75 degrees obliquity, relative to the 
exposed wires on the zenith deck.  The ultimate objective was to develop a design that prevented penetration of 3mm 
aluminum spheres from the worst case impact conditions shown in Table 1.     
    As shown in Table 3, SPHC analyses showed that the enhanced shield was capable of preventing penetration of 3-mm 
aluminum and 2.12-mm steel orbital debris particles at the stated conditions.   
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Fig. 3.  Number of wires cut in 36-wire bundle for given combinations of orbital debris densities, diameters and velocities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
Fig. 4.  Probability of critical failure vs. wire harness size given randomly placed redundant wire failure. 
 
 
 
654   Joel E. Williamsen and Steven W. Evans /  Procedia Engineering  103 ( 2015 )  650 – 656 
 
Table 1.  Cumulative number of cable failures for three cable sizes (1 foot length, zentih/nadir orientation, 1 year exposure). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Effect of shadowing and reduced criticality on a typical 8 foot cable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Fig. 5.  Enhanced shield configuration for defeat of 3mm aluminum orbital debris particles. 
    Once the ballistic limit for the worst case orientation (and highest orbital debris flux) was determined using SPHC, the 
exposed area for the blanket (and wiring beneath it) was calculated using the configuration shown in Figure 5.  The JPSS-1 
spacecraft features radiators on the “sides” of the spacecraft that block much of the orbital debris from approaching the 
spacecraft from angles at 15 degrees or more from the velocity vector.   Table 2 shows that there is a 5.3% probability that 
one or more orbital debris penetrations of the enhanced shield over the zenith deck wiring will occur in the expected 7 year 
operation of the JPSS-1 spacecraft.  Most of this risk results from penetration by stainless steel particles, due to their lower 
ballistic limit and higher flux on the enhanced wiring shield. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bundle S ize S teel   A luminum Total 
6 
18 
36 
0.075 
0.111 
0.143 
0.024 
0.065 
0.080 
0.099 
0.176 
0.223 
C able Length (ft) 
Baseline 
N F ails 
P ortside 
S hadowing 
R am D ir. 
S hadowing 
45 deg 
S hadowing 
Bundle 
S hadowing C riticality 
R ealistic 
N F ails 
1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0.446 
0.446 
0.446 
0.446 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.46 
0.46 
0.46 
0.46 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
0.84 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.043084 
0.043084 
0 
0 
Baseline N F ails 
F ailure per foot 
R ealistic N F ails in 8 ft 
R ealistic failures per foot 
Baseline / R ealistic 
0.086 
0.011 
20.7 
1.784 
0.223 
2 Inches 
75 degrees 
36-strand cable 
Beta C loth 
Beta C loth 
5 layers K evlar 
Baseline M LI 
3 layers B eta C loth 
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Table 3.  Orbital debris penetration risk for enhanced wiring shield. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
    Two approaches were pursued to evaluate the risk from orbital debris penetration of exposed JPSS wiring.  In the first 
case, a “generic” approach considering normal impact of the baseline MLI over wires resulted in an evaluation of wire 
damage that was very conservative, in that it did not consider the effects of obliquity, shadowing by other spacecraft 
components and adjoining wiring, and could not be sufficiently refined to account for the exact wiring bundle design, 
including redundancy.   
In the second case, an enhanced orbital debris shield was evaluated to provide less than a 5.3% probability of 
penetration in seven years when placed over the exposed wires. However, shield penetration should not be equated to 
critical wire failure; the figure of 5.3% “risk” of shield penetration is an upper bound for critical wire failure risk, for the 
following reasons: 
 
x Actual wire coverage is less than the coverage of the MMOD blanket (lowering critical wire risk), 
x There is a higher ballistic limit of the shield at other approach angles, since that debris approaches at a lower 
velocity, 
x Not every wire is critical, and many wires are redundant, and 
x Many of the critical wires are placed below other wires, so more shadowing is likely than was accounted for in this 
assessment. 
Considering these factors, the probability of critical wire failure on the zenith deck could be well below 1%. 
 
 
S teel risk with shadowing  A luminum risk with shadowing 
Approach 
Angle (deg) 
Approach 
Angle (deg) BL  for N BL  for N P en F lx P en F lx Area Area 
7 years 
N pens 
7 years 
N pens 
5 5 
15 15 
25 
35 
25 
35 
45 45 
55 55 
65 65 
75 75 
85 85 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
2.12 
3.448e-3 
1.757e-3 
9.42e-4 
6.88e-4 
5.49e-4 
4.84e-4 
4.62e-4 
4.71e-4 
9.55e-5 
0.562 
0.488 
0.272 
0.098 
0.042 
0.013 
0.005 
0.0006 
0.0002 
1.356e-2 
6.001e-3 
1.793e-3 
4.722e-4 
1.614e-4 
4.405e-5 
1.616e-5 
1.980e-6 
1.337e-7 
Total 0.0441 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
6.78e-4 
5.03e-4 
2.59e-4 
1.84e-4 
1.49e-4 
1.29e-4 
1.16e-4 
1.14e-4 
6.57e-5 
0.562 
0.488 
0.272 
0.098 
0.042 
0.013 
0.005 
0.0006 
0.0002 
2.669e-3 
1.718e-3 
4.932e-4 
1.262e-4 
4.387e-5 
1.173e-5 
4.072e-6 
4.803e-7 
9.192e-8 
Total 0.0101 
Ppen Ppen 0.0431 0.0101 
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